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A Strongly Differing Opinion
on Proof-Theoretic Semantics?
Wilfrid Hodges
Abstract Responding to an invitation from Peter Schroeder-Heister, the paper reacts
to some criticisms of ‘model theory’ voiced among proof theorists interested in proof-
theoretic semantics. It argues that the criticisms are poorly targeted: they conflate
model theory with model-theoretic semantics and with the model-theoretic definition
of logical consequence, which are three largely unrelated areas of study. On defining
the meanings of logical constants, and of natural language expressions in general, the
paper lays out some methodological requirements that any satisfactory definitions
would need to meet, for example about generalisability from one context of use to
other contexts. On defining logical consequence, the paper argues that some points
made recently by Schroeder-Heister and Kosta Došen are largely sound and probably
uncontroversial if clearly stated, but their impact is blurred by some question-begging
formulations.
Keywords Proof-theoretic semantics · Model-theoretic semantics · Definition of
logical consequence · Tarski
It was very kind of Peter Schroeder-Heister to invite me to contribute to this meaty
conference. He said:
. . . you would fit very well into this meeting, even though (or perhaps
because) you have opinions that strongly differ from [those] of the majority
of people at the conference. Perhaps you can give a talk in defence of model
theory, as far as the foundations of logic are concerned.
(1)
That’s a fantastic invitation, and I went to the meeting resolved to disagree with as
many people as possible.
In the event it was not so easy. Partly there was serious research being done in
proof theory, and I am not a proof theorist. Partly there were a good number of
entirely sensible and friendly people. But also I often found it hard to see what the
issues were. I think this was not entirely my fault. Straw men were being set up and
W. Hodges (B)
Okehampton, Devon, England, UK
e-mail: wilfrid.hodges@btinternet.com
© The Author(s) 2016
T. Piecha and P. Schroeder-Heister (eds.), Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics,
Trends in Logic 43, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-22686-6_11
173
174 W. Hodges
knocked down. I could see this most clearly when the straw men were described as
model theorists, because I do know something about model theory, and some of the
views being attributed to model theorists were not ones I recognised. This impression
was strengthened when I read a recent paper of Peter’s in Synthese [14].
So I had plenty to disagree with, but not in a very satisfactory way. It’s more
edifying to discuss substantive issues than to clear away misunderstandings. But the
clearance work has to be done first. I will try to keep it both brief and profitable.
I thank Peter Schroeder-Heister and Kosta Došen for some valuable discussions.
1 Straw Model Theory
A good place to start will be an elegant paper of Dag Prawitz [11] from 1974. There
is a lot that I agree with in the paper, but I was pulled up sharp when he said:
In model theory, one concentrates on questions like what sentences are
logically valid and what sentences follow logically from other sentences
[11, p. 66].
(2)
I can say with absolute confidence that I never met a model theorist who ‘concen-
trates on questions like what sentences are logically valid and what sentences follow
logically from other sentences’. On his next page Prawitz discusses Alfred Tarski’s
proposal for defining logical consequence, from his paper of 1936 [17]. So it seems
likely that Prawitz reached the view stated in (2) by assuming that Tarski’s 1936
paper is of interest to model theorists. This is not in fact the case. Nothing in the
paper is of any interest to model theorists, except perhaps those with an interest in
the prehistory of their subject.
Peter Schroeder-Heister adds another ingredient to the mix in his recent paper [14],
namely model-theoretic semantics. This is a discipline concerned with describing
meanings, so Peter rightly connects it with questions about how one should describe
the meanings of logical constants. But its origins are quite different from those of the
model-theoretic truth definition, and it belongs to a different research community.
Model theorists don’t do model-theoretic semantics either. I do know one person
who contributes to model-theoretic semantics using techniques of model theory,
namely Dag Westerståhl; but there are not many of him. In short, the three areas of
research—model theory, the definition of logical consequence and model-theoretic
semantics—are quite different and they have hardly anything in common beyond a
connection with models in the sense associated with Alfred Tarski.
So now let me unpick the historical relations between these areas. (All the com-
ments on Tarski below draw out material from my [10].)
There are some other research areas that connect with Tarski’s notion of models
but not with each other. One is mental model theory as pursued by the cognitive
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scientist Ruth Byrne [2], and another is the model-theoretic syntax advocated by the
linguists Geoffrey Pullum and Barbara Scholz [12].
1.1 Tarski’s Definition of Logical Consequence
During the years 1929–1933 Tarski put together a definition of the concept ‘φ is a true
sentence of the language L’ [16], which has become known as ‘Tarski’s definition
of truth’. Tarski stated some very strict conditions that his definition had to meet.
All symbols of the language L (apart from punctuation—we ignore this below) must
be fully meaningful. The definition is written in the formalised metalanguage of L ,
but justified in the informal meta-metalanguage. It must use only higher-order logic,
concepts expressible in the language L itself, and some syntactic notions. It must
be extensionally correct: the objects satisfying it must be exactly the objects that
we count intuitively as true sentences of L . The extensional correctness must be
informally provable in the meta-metatheory of L . This is not the place to go into
further details. The paper became well known through a German translation in 1935.
It makes no reference to models, and model theorists don’t cite it.
In 1935 Tarski was persuaded to attend the International Congress of Philoso-
phers in Paris. Worrying about what he could say to impress the philosophers, he
formed the idea of presenting the truth definition as a vehicle for giving formal defi-
nitions of various notions from logical metatheory, among them the notion of logical
consequence. The result was a pair of papers, [17] presenting the definition of logi-
cal consequence, and [18] discussing the general idea of defining semantic notions
[5, pp. 95ff].
The paper [17] on logical consequence answered a methodological question, not
a question of conceptual analysis. You can’t do conceptual analysis until you have a
concept to analyse. But when Tarski wrote, there was no agreed concept of logical
consequence to be analysed. (One should look first at what was available in the litera-
ture of his time. For example Hilbert and Ackermann [8, p. 1] have a proof-theoretic
notion of Logische Folgerung, while Carnap [3, p. 10] speaks of one proposition
being a Grund for another, without any clear definition. Tarski may also have fac-
tored in earlier ideas, like Bolzano’s Ableitbarkeit and various medieval notions of
consequentia.) Tarski makes exactly this point in his opening paragraph, noting that
‘every precise definition of this concept will show arbitrary features to a greater or
[lesser] degree’ [19, p. 409]. In fact the term ‘logical consequence’ itself seems to
have become common in philosophical logic only as a result of Tarski’s paper.
To see what the methodological question was, we need to put the paper in context.
Gödel had recently shown that there is no maximal proof calculus for pure logic of
second or higher order. Ramsey [13] had discussed languages with infinite conjunc-
tions, and both Bernays [1, pp. 86ff.] and Tarski himself [19, p. 288] had considered
proof rules with infinitely many premises. So some very general questions about
proof calculi were in the air, and some robust and well-motivated definitions were
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needed for handling them. Tarski seems to have clarified the central question in his
own mind along the following lines:
What are the weakest constraints that we can put on a rule for deriving proposi-
tions from sets of propositions in a formal language, which make it reasonable
to count any rule satisfying these constraints as an inference rule?
He proposed to label these constraints as saying that the conclusion of the rule is a
‘logical consequence’ of its premises.
Now for Tarski in 1935 there were two kinds of formal language. In the first kind,
which we can call ‘pure’ languages, all symbols are logical. In the second kind,
which we can call ‘applied’, there are also nonlogical symbols, but these symbols
are all required to be fully meaningful. For pure languages, Tarski adopted just the
constraint that whenever the premises are true the conclusion must be true too. This
constraint looks trivial, but in Paris in 1935 it served the purpose of advertising his
recent formal definition of ‘true’.
For applied languages Tarski had to decide what to do about analytical rela-
tions between the meanings of the nonlogical constants. For example Hilbert in his
Göttingen lectures around 1920 (which formed the basis of his book with Acker-
mann) had observed that ‘Tony Blair is a parent’ entails ‘Tony Blair has a child’ (my
adaptation of Hilbert’s more traditional example). Would it be appropriate to allow
an inference rule that takes one from the first sentence to the second? Tarski decided
no. An inference rule should be invariant under systematic changes of the meanings
of the nonlogical symbols; but if we swap the meanings of ‘has a child’ and ‘has
bright red hair’, then the proposed inference rule would take a true premise to a false
conclusion.
It’s noticeable that Tarski’s own text says almost nothing about relations between
the meanings of the nonlogical constants (there is a brief parenthetical remark in the
middle of P. 415 in [19]), but has at least a page on the importance of the difference
between (i) changing a symbol to one with a different meaning and (ii) replacing
the symbol by a variable that arbitrary objects can be assigned to. That tells me that
Tarski in 1935 was really more interested in fine-tuning the notion of satisfaction
than in accommodating the philosophers in Paris.
The paper does use the word ‘model’, though not in the modern sense. The name
‘model-theoretic definition of logical consequence’ is not Tarski’s, and I think it
came into use only after the later developments that we turn to next.
1.2 Model Theory
During the 1930s and 1940s Tarski maintained a strict distinction between mathe-
matics and metamathematics. Because of this, he was still in 1938 reluctant to accept
that a set of formal axioms could serve to define the class of structures which satisfy
them—as for example the class of rings consists of the structures that satisfy the
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axioms of ring theory. But mathematical developments put him under pressure to
change his mind. By 1950 he was ready to embrace what we now know as model
theory, and he devoted the early 1950s to setting up the basics of the theory.
In the course of this work, Tarski rejigged his old truth definition, so that instead of
defining ‘φ is a true sentence of the language L’ it defined ‘φ is a sentence true in the
structure M for the language L’, where now L is a formal language whose nonlogical
symbols have no meaning and the structure M is used to assign meanings to these
symbols. This new truth definition is known as the ‘model-theoretic truth definition’.
You can find it in standard textbooks of model theory. But in practice model theorists
mostly use just the separate recursive clauses of the definition, for example that a¯
satisfies ∀yφ(x¯, y) in M if and only if for every element b of M , a¯b satisfies φ(x¯, y)
in M . These clauses are all older than Tarski’s work. The definition as a whole
does guarantee that the relation ‘φ is true in the structure M’ is set-theoretically
definable, though today most logicians would reckon that this is intuitively obvious.
Occasionally it’s useful to know that the definition can be written as a set-theoretic
formula of a particular form.
The model-theoretic truth definition uses an adaptation of the idea of satisfac-
tion that Tarski introduced in his 1933 truth definition and exploited in the 1936
paper. If you apply that model-theoretic adaptation to the 1936 definition of logical
consequence, you get
φ is a logical consequence of T if and only if every model of T is a model
of φ (3)
where now φ is a sentence and T a set of sentences, in a language whose nonlogical
symbols are meaningless. It happens that the righthand clause of (3) is a relation that
appears very often in model theory, so it would be useful to have a name for it. On the
basis of the facts above, Tarski in 1953 [20, p. 8] proposed reading the relation as ‘φ
is a logical consequence of T ’. Model theorists have tended to follow Tarski’s lead
and pronounce the relation as ‘T entails φ’ or ‘φ is a consequence of T ’. The use of
the name has nothing to do with any interest in the concept of logical consequence
itself.
Tarski’s 1953 essay [20] seems to have had some unintended consequences among
philosophers. A number of people conflated the 1936 definition with the 1953 one,
and called both of them the ‘model-theoretic definition of logical consequence’. I
think the conflation is unfortunate, because the question we discussed in 1.1.1 above,
about analytical relations between meanings, is one of the most important questions
addressed in the 1936 definition, but it is meaningless for the languages of first-order
model theory. Later, during the 1980s, the ‘model-theoretic definition of logical
consequence’ attracted the attention of some philosophers who reassessed it as a
contribution to conceptual analysis.
Peter in his invitation to me (1) referred to a ‘defence of model theory, as far as
the foundations of logic are concerned’. I think I’ll give this a miss. To me, model
theory is a way of addressing certain kinds of question in mathematics, chiefly but not
exclusively in geometry, algebra and number theory. The main link to foundations
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of logic is that some techniques of model theory made their way into axiomatic set
theory around 1960 and continue to have an influence in large cardinal theory.
1.3 Model-Theoretic Semantics
So far, nothing that I’ve mentioned is directly to do with semantics, i.e. the study of
meanings. Tarski called his truth definition the ‘semantic definition of truth’, most
probably because of a formal similarity with what Kotarbin´ski had called ‘semantic
definitions’. In his truth paper [19, p. 193f.] he listed some notions that he called
‘semantic’: denotation, definability, truth. The notion ‘meaning’ was not in his list,
and this is certainly not an accident.
During the 1960s a number of papers appeared that were about extending model
theory from non-modal formal languages to modal ones. Some people described
this as giving ‘model-theoretic semantics’ for modal logics. I suppose that originally
‘giving a semantics’ meant giving a model theory that would allow one to talk in
a concrete and precise way about truth and satisfaction of modal formulas. But a
subtle shift started to take place. In a standard model for modal logic, each relation
symbol has an ‘intension’, which is a function taking each possible world to a set
that is the extension of the relation symbol in that world. You can think of extensions
as references, and intensions as meanings—though a lot of people have criticised
these analogies. So you can think of a model for the modal logic as assigning to each
meaningful expression of the language an intension that represents the ‘meaning’
of that expression. Around 1970 Richard Montague adapted all these notions to
the study of fragments of natural languages, building on earlier work of Rudolf
Carnap. From that date onwards it became common to refer to Montague-style model
theories of natural language as ‘model-theoretic semantics’. (Though Barbara Partee,
a pioneer in this area, describes her field as ‘formal semantics’.) From the mid
1970s onwards, the people who did model-theoretic semantics were mostly linguists
or philosophers of language. The earlier model-theoretic semantics had been done
mostly by philosophical logicians, and almost never by model theorists.
Model-theoretic semantics is useless for lexicography—you learn nothing about
the meaning of the Greek noun skindapsós by being told that its intension maps
every possible world to the set of all the things in that world that fit the description
skindapsós. But it comes into its own for describing how the meaning of a compound
phrase depends on the meanings of its constituents. Earlier we illustrated how the
clauses of Tarski’s truth definition tell us what things satisfy a compound formula,
in terms of what things satisfy its immediate subformulas. Tarski had one clause for
each logical operator: the logical operators →, ¬, ∀ etc., are all of them expressions
whose meaning is explained by saying how the meaning of a compound formed by
means of them depends on the meanings of the constituent expressions. In modal logic
and its variants we add to those logical constants other expressions like ‘necessarily’,
‘believes’, ‘until’. Formal semanticists push the boat out and apply similar machinery
to ‘himself’, ‘hardly ever’ and ‘so much as’ (for example).
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Model-theoretic semantics and the model-theoretic definition of logical conse-
quence were always completely separate. You might reckon that there is a link,
because both of them are involved with giving meanings. But there are major differ-
ences. First, in studying logical consequence we are only concerned with the meaning
of one expression; model-theoretic semantics aims to get a purchase on language as
a whole. Second, Tarski always assumed that the expression ‘logical consequence
of’ was not in the formal language L; it was an expression of the metatheory. Of
course one can put it into the object language, but Tarski himself avoided doing this,
because he had proved that languages containing enough of their own metatheory
generate contradictions. So a person who wants to add ‘logical consequence of’ to
the object language has the extra task of proving that the resulting language is still
consistent. And third, the aim with logical consequence was to give a definition of
it, under suitable constraints. Model-theoretic semantics doesn’t give definitions, it
gives truth-conditions.
So it was curious to read the introduction to Peter Schroeder-Heister’s [14] and find
him claiming that ‘classical model-theoretic semantics’ makes various assumptions
about how logical consequence should be defined. I assumed at first that he was using
‘model-theoretic semantics’ as a name for the model-theoretic definition of logical
consequence. But then almost at once he talks about model-theoretic treatment of
the logical operators, and that really is in the realm of model-theoretic semantics.
Well, it’s not good history but it’s an intriguing question all the same. Could there
be a theory that helpfully combines definition of metatheoretic notions with the
techniques of model-theoretic semantics? What problems would it run into? What
constraints should it aim to observe? What kinds of new result could we expect from
combining the two things? I think it’s clear that Peter himself doesn’t want to go
down this road, but somebody else might. (Maybe somebody already has, in which
case I give them my apologies and best wishes.)
2 Defining Meanings in General
We can separate out two strands in the aims of proof-theoretic semantics. One is to use
proof theory to specify the meanings of logical constants. This can be generalised to
specifying the meanings of other expressions too. (Peter tells me he would welcome
faster progress in this direction, for example using more advanced proof-theoretic
tools like those used to handle inductive definitions.) The other is to give a good
description of logical consequence from the point of view of proof theory. I assume
Peter’s invitation was to comment on both of these aims. In this section I tackle
meanings in general, and in the next section I turn to logical consequence.
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2.1 Defining Meanings: Specialise Then Generalise
In the introduction to his Stanford Encyclopedia entry on ‘Proof-Theoretic Seman-
tics’ [15] Peter says:
. . . the meaning of a term should be explained by reference to the way it is used
in our language.
That’s a very reasonable starting-point. I wasn’t clear whether Peter takes ‘our
language’ to be English (or German), or a formal language used in logic, but I’ll
assume the former. Paraphrasing Peter’s statement a little, the meaning of an expres-
sion E in a language L is what you need to know in order to use E in L . But we
should exclude purely grammatical information about E , so a safer statement is
The meaning of an expression E in a language L is the further information that
you need in order to use E in L , if you already know the grammatical facts
about E .
There is more to be said on this, but not here.
Straight away we hit a problem. Life is open-ended, and so is language. The
same expression can be used in indefinitely many different situations, and a priori
there is no reason to think we can write down the rules for using the expression in
a manageable description that covers all cases. This certainly applies to the logical
constants ‘and’, ‘every’ and so on, which occur throughout the language and not just
in contexts of logical argument.
So in practice we do what linguists have to do constantly in their studies. We
narrow down to a set of contexts that we can handle, and we give rules for using the
expression in those contexts. Then we rely on general facts about life and language
to determine how the expression would be used in other contexts. I will call the
narrow set of contexts the primary applications, and I will call the arguments used
for generalising from the primary applications to the whole language the transfer
arguments.
The ‘Frege-Geach problem’ illustrates these notions. In 1965 Peter Geach wrote a
paper [7] in which—among other things—he attacked the view that you can explain
the meaning of the sentence
He hit her. (4)
by saying that it ascribes a certain kind of action to ‘him’. Geach argues that this
explanation won’t carry over to contexts where (4) is used but not asserted, for
example when it follows the word ‘If’. In contexts where (4) is not asserted, it
doesn’t ascribe anything. But, says Geach, the explanation needs to be carried over
to these contexts, because we can apply modus ponens and argue
He hit her. If he hit her then q. Therefore q.
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Moreover the two occurrences of the sentence, ‘by itself and in the “if” clause, must
have the same sense if the modus ponens is not to be vitiated by equivocation’ [7,
p. 462f].
I used to think that Geach’s argument was a very clever way of refuting all sorts
of plausible theories. I still think it’s clever, but now it seems to me to prove almost
nothing. When we explain how an expression is used in certain contexts, transfer
arguments will always be needed to infer how it is used in other contexts. In fact
looking again at Geach’s paper, I see that this agrees with his conclusion:
. . . it is up to [the person giving this kind of explanation] to give an account of
the role of “p” that will allow of its standing as a premise. This task is pretty
consistently shirked. [7, p. 463]
The key point that Geach contributes is that the validity of the modus ponens argument
is a constraint on possible transfer arguments.
We must ask: Who has the responsibility for handling the transfer arguments?
To illustrate with ‘and’: a person who is explaining ‘the way it is used in our
language’ will need to explain its use not just between propositions in deductions,
but also such uses as
formally correct and materially adequate; black and white. (5)
There are subtleties here: a formally correct and materially adequate definition is a
formally correct definition that is also materially adequate, but a black and white cat
is not a black cat that is also white. How did we know this?
You might argue that this property of ‘black and white’ is something for the
linguists to worry about, and not a thing that proof theorists could be expected to
have views on. But on the other hand linguists can’t make bricks without straw: if
the proof theorists expect the linguists to explain how the proof-theoretic meaning of
‘and’ transfers to uses like those in (5), then they must be prepared for the linguists
to complain that the proof-theoretic meaning just isn’t enough to generalise from.
Somebody has to take responsibility for the join-up.
The point is very general. For example an explanation of the meaning of ‘He hit
her’ in terms of truth conditions raises the question how we can infer what it means
to say
Last Friday Zayd hit Amr very hard, to teach him a lesson.
Obviously if you specified the meaning of ‘hit’ as the set of ordered pairs (a, b) such
that a hit b, then you are going to have serious problems answering this question. (I
stole this example from the great 11th century semanticist Abd al-Qa¯hir al-Jurja¯nı¯.
Today people working on the semantics of tree-adjoining grammars wrestle with the
same problem.)
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2.2 Representing the Meaning
When we describe the meaning of an expression, we always do it in some format:
maybe a picture, or a diagram, or a formal definition in words, or a physical demon-
stration, or an abstract set, or . . . In other words, the information about the expression
always has to be packaged up as an object—I will call the object the semantic value
of the expression—in some form of representation. This places on us the burden on
making sure that both we and the people we are speaking to can read the represen-
tation, i.e. that we can understand what information the semantic value is supposed
to convey.
There is a great temptation for logicians just to throw symbols on the page and hope





But what does this diagram mean? Does it mean for example one of the following?
(a) If we are entitled to assert (φ and ψ) then this fact entitles us to assert φ.
(b) If we have already asserted (φ and ψ) then we are entitled to assert φ.
(c) If we are committed to defending (φ and ψ) then we are committed to defending
φ.
(d) If (φ ∧ ψ) is true then so is φ.
(e) In any situation S, if (φ ∧ ψ) is true in S then φ is true in S.
Some of these statements are deducible from others by general principles. Let me
straight away generalise the notion of transfer arguments to include the arguments
that justify these deductions. These arguments generalise not from one context of
use to another, but from one kind of statement about use to another kind of statement
about use.
Note that if we use reading (e), then there is a very plausible argument to show
that the natural deduction rules for ∧ and the standard truth table for ∧ give exactly
the same information about ∧, so that in this case the difference between a proof-
theoretic semantics and a model-theoretic one becomes purely one of notation. But
in any case a person who wants to compare model-theoretic semantics with proof-
theoretic semantics for logical operators will need to answer the question above for
(6), and similar ones for the other natural deduction diagrams and for truth tables.
This applies to intuitionist logical operators just as much as to classical ones.
There seem to be more ways of reading a formal derivation than there are of
reading a truth table. Derivations, particularly in Hilbert-style or natural deduction
formalisms, look a bit like formalised natural language arguments. But usually they
are missing the explanatory tags that we put all over the place in natural language
arguments: ‘Then’, ‘But’, ‘Suppose’, ‘I grant that’, ‘I think I can show that’, ‘I claim
that’ etc. etc.
To illustrate the possibilities, let me sketch how Ibn Sı¯na¯ thought we should read
arguments in which an assumption is made and then discharged [9]. He observed
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that when we introduce an assumption φ by saying ‘If φ’, we don’t always repeat
the ‘If φ’ whenever we state a proposition that depends on the assumption. (That’s
certainly so if φ is introduced with ‘Let’ or ‘Suppose’. But Ibn Sı¯na¯ is right; one can
find enough examples where it’s true with ‘If’ too.) So, he argued, we must intend
that ‘If φ then’ should be understood at the beginning of all relevant propositions





(φ →φ ) Ψ
(φ χ )
(7)
In the ‘understood but not stated’ derivation on the right, the formula (φ → φ)
at the top is an axiom, and the discharging step that derives (φ → χ) from χ falls
away. A general metarule asserts that for every step ,α  β we have a step
, (φ→α)  (φ→β). (This analysis is extraordinarily close to Frege’s explanation
of making and discharging assumptions, though it was given over 800 years before
Frege. But as Peter noted at the meeting, Ibn Sı¯na¯ and Frege had different motivations.
In fact Ibn Sı¯na¯ wanted to understand the real intentions of the person giving the proof,
whereas Frege aimed through Begriffsschrift to display the true ‘logical weaving’ of
informal proofs that begin ‘Let . . .’ [6, pp. 379ff].)
Ibn Sı¯na¯’s position is in effect a claim about what kind of contentful argument is
expressed by the natural deduction rules. So it’s directly relevant to how we can read
the proof rule of →-introduction as carrying information about the meaning of →.
The discussion so far has used only natural deduction proof rules. It would be
possible to give a semantics using  as a primitive notion, so that for example we
define ∧ by
(φ ∧ ψ)  φ, (φ ∧ ψ)  ψ, φ,ψ  (φ ∧ ψ). (8)
(There are well-known variants of this definition.) The difficulty with taking  as
primitive is that until we have a definition of , there is going to be no purchase
for transfer arguments. In particular we won’t be able even to raise the question
whether (8) gives the same information as a truth table for ∧, frankly because until
 is explained, we don’t know what information (8) is giving us.
One last point: some kinds of semantics refer to the semantic value of an expression
as the ‘denotation’ of the expression. This is just a name, no more. It certainly doesn’t
entail that the semantics treats expressions as proper names of their semantic values.
To single out some kinds of semantics as ‘denotational’ is like singling out the
semantics that are written in Turkish; the classification is pointless.
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3 Defining Logical Consequence
In both his truth definition and his definition of logical consequence, Tarski set new
standards of carefulness about the requirements he was imposing on the definitions:
what concepts could be used in the definitions, and what assumptions could be
used in the justifications of the definitions. You can attack his definitions either by
showing that they failed to meet the requirements, or by arguing that the requirements
were inappropriate for his purposes. Or of course you can propose some different
requirements that suit a different agenda. This third option wouldn’t be an attack on
Tarski; it would be an alternative venture.
Here is an example of an alternative venture. Suppose you want the definition of
logical consequence to have the following property:
For any propositions φ and ψ, if the definition of ‘ψ is a logical consequence
of φ’ is that (φ,ψ), then the statement (φ,ψ) states criteria that can be used
for convincing ourselves that ψ is (or is not) a logical consequence of φ.
To make this realistic, maybe we should add ‘at least in simple or straightforward
cases’. Also if you were a cognitive scientist, you might want to strengthen to ‘the
criteria that we would in fact use for convincing ourselves . . .’; then the definition
would express a theory about how we think.
It’s not hard to show that Tarski’s definition doesn’t have this property. For Tarski
the statement (φ,ψ) takes the form
For every interpretation or model M , if M makes φ true then M makes ψ true.
Because of the quantifier over all M , in practice the only way of showing that (φ,ψ)
holds will normally be to show the stronger statement
For every interpretation or model M , ‘M makes ψ true’ is a logical consequence
of ‘M makes φ true’.
But this is just a more complicated variant of ‘ψ is a logical consequence of φ’, so it
can’t provide the criteria we asked for.
Prawitz presents this argument very clearly [11, p. 67f.]. But the basic point is
older. It goes back at least to Ibn Sı¯na¯, who used it to argue that you can’t use
the notion ‘true in situation S’ as a device for making the validity of an inference
intuitively clear. (This appears in his Qiya¯s iii.2, unfortunately still available only
in Arabic.) Several people including me have suggested that the argument poses at
least a theoretical difficulty for those mental model theorists who maintain that we
do in fact reason by making the kind of move that Ibn Sı¯na¯ criticised. So I don’t think
that proof-theoretic semanticists who present the argument should assume they are
in any way swimming against the tide.
Looking around the literature in proof-theoretic semantics, I don’t in fact see
anything that I would regard as a criticism of Tarski’s definition. Things that are
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phrased as attacks on the definition are usually pleas for a different agenda. Nothing
compels us to stick to the agendas of eighty years ago.
A striking pair of papers by Peter Schroeder-Heister [14] and Kosta Došen [4]
raise a number of questions about the nature of definitions, and about what can be
defined in terms of what. I very much welcome the questions—the general theory
of definition has had a very patchy treatment by logicians in the last century—and I
agree with most of the positive points that Peter and Kosta make. But some of their
claims about the views of other people seem to me mighty strange.
At the heart of their arguments against ‘model-theoretic semantics’ is the question
what can be defined in terms of what. This was a question of constant interest to the
traditional Aristotelian logicians, and a large part of what they said about it strikes
me as codswallop. Ouch—on general principle one shouldn’t say that sort of thing
about the logic of a distant culture. But what else can you say about people who insist
that the only correct definition of ‘human’ is ‘mortal rational animal’, and give only
circular arguments in support of this view?
There are still people who operate a broadly Aristotelian notion of the hierarchy
of concepts. One notable example is the linguist Anna Wierzbicka [21, cf. p. 10].
She seems to operate by a kind of introspection of concepts. The main difficulty
of introspection is that you can never be sure what is the source of the information
that it serves up. I think in fact there are two main kinds of reason for regarding
concept C as prior to concept D in the hierarchy of definitions. Both these reasons
can in principle be lifted out of introspection and made objective, which is always
an improvement.
The first kind of reason is that because of the way our minds work, we wouldn’t
be able to understand D unless we already understood C . For example could you
understand what it is to be vengeful if you didn’t already understand what it is to be
angry? Could you understand what it is to be infectious if you didn’t understand what
it is to be ill? Or closer to home, could you come to have a concept of satisfaction
if you didn’t already have a concept of truth? In theory at least, questions of these
kinds can be answered by seeing what you can teach to children, or whether there are
natural languages in which there is a word for D but no word for C . There are surely
important cognitive facts to be discovered here, but I for one would rather leave it to
the experts.
The second kind of reason is not cognitive but semantic. An example is that you
can define ‘x is a mother’ in terms of ‘x is the mother of y’ by quantifying out the
y, but there is no logical operation that goes in the opposite direction. To handle
examples like this, it’s almost essential to put in the variables, because the whole
point is that ‘mother of’ has an extra argument that is missing in ‘mother’—it has an
extra degree of freedom. In fact Tarski and his teacher Les´niewski seem to have been
the first logicians who insisted on putting variables where they are needed, though
Frege had already raised the point.
Kosta’s paper does draw attention to one place where variables are needed. He
points out (in his §4) that a notation for derivations which only allows us to put a
variable for the conclusion is much less useful than a notation that allows us to a
variable for a hypothesis as well. This is clearly correct, and I can say so with an easy
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conscience because I have already (in (7) above) used a notation that does precisely
have variables for the hypotheses. My notation is very standard, but in fact it’s not
the one that Kosta himself recommends. In effect Kosta, working in a categorial
framework, calls for a notation that sets out the variables in the concept
f is a derivation of B from A. (9)
My notation doesn’t show the f , but if needed one could write an f in the middle
of the triangle. Also Kosta’s notation can be written in a line; this is an advantage
in text, but possibly a hindrance for writing out pictures of complex derivations.
On the other hand my notation has the advantage that it allows one to write several
hypotheses, whereas Kosta’s arrow notation allows just one source for the arrow; for
my application in (7) above, that would have been a fatal flaw. As all this illustrates,
there are some quite subtle relationships between notation and concept, and they are
very sensitive to the purpose that the notation will be put to, and the mathematical
context in which it will be used.
But elsewhere Kosta forgets the variables. For example he asks [4, §5]:
Can inferences be reduced to consequence relations? So that having an
inference from A to B means just that B is a consequence of A. (10)
where should the variables go? I suggest that the concept of an inference needs three
variables, essentially as in Kosta’s notation (9) for derivations:
x is an inference from y to z. (11)
The notion of consequence carries just two variables:
x is a consequence of y. (12)
Kosta’s question (10) asks whether (11) is definable from (12), and he expects the
answer No.
Clearly Kosta is right: (11) is not definable from (12) (and a fortiori not ‘reducible
to’ (12)) for the glaring semantic reason that (11) carries an extra argument. This is
not just an accident of Kosta’s formulation. It’s an essential part of the notion of z
being inferable from y that people can perform an act called making an inference
from y to z, but it is certainly not part of the notion of consequence that people can
make a consequence. And I agree with Kosta that this is a point worth making. I also
agree with him that for purposes of the foundations of logic, a psychological analysis
of ‘making an inference’ is not the right way to go.
But then why does Kosta add this comment?
This reduction of inference to implication, which squares well with the sec-
ond dogma of semantics, is indeed the point of view of practically all of the
philosophy of logic and language in the twentieth century.
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(He explains that ‘implication’ serves for ‘consequence’ here, so it is the same reduc-
tion as above.) Kosta seems here to be saying that the vast mass of twentieth century
researchers in philosophy of logic and language all make a mistake not far short of
adding 2 to 4 and getting 11. Sad to say, he is right that there are one or two pro-
fessionals in this field who lack this elementary competence; I could document this
but I won’t. But ‘practically all . . .’: that seems to me an unreasonable accusation to
make with no evidence offered.
Kosta also refers to ‘the second dogma of semantics’. As Kosta formulates it in
his §3 (adjusting a similar statement in Peter’s [14]), this dogma states
The correctness of the hypothetical notions reduces to the preservation of the
correctness of the categorical ones.
If I understand this right, the notion of z being inferable from y is ‘hypothetical’
because one gets to z by using y as a ‘hypothesis’. The act of doing this is essentially
the same as the act of making an inference from y to z, so we are hovering around the
same semantic distinction as before. But I don’t think I recall ever hearing anybody
argue that the notion of making an inference can be defined in terms of something
being a Tarskian consequence of something else. Rather the opposite: Tarski gave
his definition at least partly so that a usable notion of consequence was available to
people who weren’t interested in the notion of making an inference. It’s a big world,
there are lots of different things to be interested in. Preferring to work on B rather
than A is not a kind of dogma.
Kosta adds that the second dogma ‘may be understood as a corollary’ of a dogma
that categorical notions have ‘primacy’ over hypothetical notions. [4, §3] In the
mainstream semantic and model-theoretic literature that I’ve seen, nobody talks about
‘prior’ notions or about one notion having ‘primacy’ over another. So the burden is
on those who use these terms to explain what they mean by them, and what evidence
they have for attributing views that involve these terms to semanticists. Otherwise
it’s they that are the dogmatists.
Peter has asked whether people who use Tarski’s truth definition regard satisfaction
as prior to truth. It’s a reasonable question, but I think that the answer is a straight No,
except in a technical sense that is probably not much relevant to this paper. Tarski’s
truth definition goes by recursion on the complexity of formulas. It’s a common
mathematical experience that when we define or prove something by recursion, it
can be nontrivial to formulate the notion that we carry up through the recursion. Often
it will need to carry extra features that can be discarded at the end of the recursion.
The notion of satisfaction was a technical requirement of just this sort, needed for
the recursive definition. But if the question is about having informal concepts of
truth and satisfaction, then my own view has always been that satisfaction has to be
understood in terms of truth and not the other way round. I should add that this is a
question I came to through trying to give an intuitive introduction to model theory
for non-model-theorists. It’s not a question that model theorists ever have to deal
with in their normal business.
188 W. Hodges
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
1. Bernays, P.: Letter to Gödel, 18 January 1931. In: Feferman, S. (ed.) Kurt Gödel Collected
Works Volume IV, Correspondence A-G, pp. 80–91. Clarendon Press, Oxford (2003)
2. Byrne, R.: Mental Models Website. http://www.psychology.tcd.ie/other/Ruth_Byrne/mental_
models/theory.html. Cited 25 November 2013
3. Carnap, R.: Abriss der Logistik. Springer, Vienna (1929)
4. Došen, K.: Inferential semantics. In: H. Wansing (ed.) Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning,
pp. 147–162. Springer, Cham (2015)
5. Feferman, A.B., Feferman, S.: Alfred Tarski: Life and Logic. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (2004)
6. Frege, G.: Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie. Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-
Vereinigung 15, 293–309, 377–403, 423–430 (1906)
7. Geach, P.T.: Assertion. Philos. Rev. 74, 449–465 (1965)
8. Hilbert, D., Ackermann, W.: Grundzüge der Theoretischen Logik. Springer, Berlin (1928)
9. Hodges, W.: Ibn Sina on reductio ad absurdum. Review of symbolic logic (to appear)
10. Hodges, W.: Tarski’s theory of definition. In: Patterson, D. (ed.) New Essays on Tarski and
Philosophy, pp. 94–132. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2008)
11. Prawitz, D.: On the idea of a general proof theory. Synthese 27, 63–77 (1974)
12. Pullum, G.K., Scholz, B.C.: On the distinction between model-theoretic and generative-
enumerative syntactic frameworks. In: De Groote, P., et al. (eds.) Logical Aspects of Com-
putational Linguistics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2099, pp. 17–43. Springer,
Berlin (2001)
13. Ramsey, F.P.: The foundations of mathematics. Proc. Lond. Math. Soc. 25, 338–384 (1925)
14. Schroeder-Heister, P.: The categorical and the hypothetical: a critique of some fundamental
assumptions of standard semantics. Synthese 187, 925–942 (2012)
15. Schroeder-Heister, P.: Proof-theoretic semantics. In: Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy (2012). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/. Dated 5 December
2012
16. Tarski, A.: Poje˛cie prawdy w je˛zykach nauk dedukcyjnych. Prace Towarzyctwa Naukowego
Warszawskiego, Wydzial III Nauk Matematyczno-Fizycznych 34 (1933). Revised translation:
The concept of truth in formalized languages. In: [19], pp. 152–278
17. Tarski, A.: O poje˛ciu wynikania logicznego. Przegla˛d Filozoficzny 39, 58–68 (1936). Translated
as: On the concept of logical consequence. In: [19], pp. 409–420
18. Tarski, A.: O ugruntowaniu naukowej semantyki. Przegla¸d Filozoficzny 39, 50–57 (1936).
Translated as: The establishment of scientific semantics. In [19], pp. 401–408
19. Tarski, A.: Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: papers from 1923 to 1938. Corcoran, J. (ed.)
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana (1983)
20. Tarski, A., Mostowski, A., Robinson, R.: Undecidable Theories. North-Holland, Amsterdam
(1953)
21. Wierzbicka, A.: Semantics: Primes and Universals. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1996)
